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Two self-report questionnaires "Dysfunctional Schema Questionnaire" 
(DSQ) and "Cognitive Distortions Questionnaire" (CDQ) were constructed 
to measure dysfunctional schemas and cognitive distortions associated with 
anxiety, depression, and aggression in a community sample of 581 
adolescents. The correlational analysis supported the validity ofBeck's 
cognitive model. The hierarchical regression analyses indicated that 
dysftmctional schemas and cognitive distortions are disorder-specific, and 
that cognitive distortions are event-specific as well. On the other hand, the 
results revealed that depression-related dysfimctional schema was not a 
strong predictor of depression when competing with depression-related 
cognitive distortions in regression analysis. Within the various subtypes of 
cognitive distortions, depression-related personalizing was not a strong 
predictor of depression when competing with depression-related 
catastrophizing in regression analysis. 
摘要 
本論文以兩份自創的自陳量表:失效機略量表Pysflmctional Schema 
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Li recent years cognitive theories have played an increasingly 
prominent role in the understanding and treatment of psychopathology, 
including depression ( Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), anxiety (Beck & 
Emery, 1985; Barlow, 1988; Rachman & Master, 1988), eating disorders 
(Fairbum & Cooper，1987; Hsu, 1990), personality disorders (Freeman & 
Leaf, 1989; Beck, Freeman & Associates, 1990; Young, 1990), and more 
recently substance abuse (Beck, Wright, Newman, & Liese, 1993). The 
rationale and procedures of cognitive therapy have evolved over the last two 
to three decades, but their initial impetus came from Aaron Beck's early 
therapy with depressed clients (Beck, 1963). 
Cognitive Factors 
Beck's cognitive model acknowledges the importance ofbiological, 
emotional，and behavioural factors in the genesis of psychopathology, but it 
primarily emphasizes the associated cognitive factors. SpecificaJily, these 
cognitive factors can be classified into three categories: cognitive schemas, 
cognitive processes, and cognitive products. 
Cognitive schemas. Cognitive schemas are general, stable cognitive 
patterns, which form the basis for the regularity of interpretation of events 
(Beck et al., 1979). The cognitive schemas in psychopathology are 
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dysfimctional, and is known as dysfunctional schemas, dysfunctional 
assumptions or dysfimctional beliefs. Li the present study, the term 
'dysfunctional schemas' is used 
Dysfimctional schemas have been acquired in the early years oflife 
via relationships with significant caretakers, and are held firmly in place by 
behavioural, cognitive, and affective elements (Young, 1994). Once in 
place, they selectively filter for corroborating experience. When facing a 
particular event, a schema related to the circumstance will be activated. 
For examples, a failure experience couM activate a schema ofpersonal loss; 
a threatening experience could activate a schema ofpersonal danger; a 
rejecting experience could activate a schema ofunfaimess. 
Cognitive processes. Cognitive processes refer to those information 
processing which include attention, selection, transformation, encoding, 
storing, and retrieving. The results of such information processing affect 
our emotional and behavioural responses to events. Li psychopathological 
conditions，systematic biases are introduced into this information processing, 
which result in cognitive distortions or cognitive errors. The term 
'cognitive distortion' will be used in the present study, as it indicates an 
idiosyncratic way ofprocessing the information. 
Different types of cognitive distortions have been identified in 
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emotional disorders (Beck et al., 1979; Beck & Emery，1985, p.32-35), 
which include: 
1. arbitrary inference: the process of drawing a specific conclusion in the 
absence of evidence to support the conclusion or when the evidence is 
contrary to the conclusion; 
2. selective abstraction: forming conclusions based on an isolated detail of 
an event, ignoring other evidence; 
3. overgeneralization: holding extreme ideas based on particular events and 
applying them to unrelated situations; 
4. personalization or internal attribution: taking excessive responsibility for 
events when there is no basis for making such a connection; 
5. catastrophization: dwelling on the worst possible outcome of any 
situation in which there is a possibility for an unpleasant outcome; and 
6. dichotomous thinking: thinking in all-or-none terms, categorizing 
experiences and people only in one or two extremes, with no middle ground. 
Cognitive products. Cognitive products refer to the thoughts or 
images occurring in the stream of consciousness (Marizillier, 1980), that is 
the automatic thoughts. They are the products of the interaction among 
cognitive schemas, cognitive processes, and external events. According to 
Beck (1976), automatic thoughts are defined as nonvolitional，stream-of-
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consciousness cognitions, which appear to come on automatically and are 
not easily dismissed Li psychopathology, these automatic thoughts 
revolve around negative events, and are referred as automatic negative 
thoughts. For examples, in depressed people, the theme of their automatic 
thoughts is about loss; in anxious people, the theme is about threat and 
danger; whereas in aggressive people, the theme is about hostility. 
The Content-Specificity Hypothesis 
The presence ofnegative life events will activate the dormant 
dysfunctional schema (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979; Beck & Emery, 
1985), which produces automatic negative thoughts via a distorted 
information processing and subsequently leads to psychological 
disturbances. This is Beck's cognitive model of psychopathology, which 
is general to all forms of psychopathologies. However, dysfunctional 
schema is disorder-specific, that is, the contents of the dysfunctional schema 
vary in different psychopathologies. Thus, psychological disorders can be 
differentiated on the basis oftheir dominant dysfunctional schema. This is 
called the content-specificity hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, it appears that not only dysfunctional schema is 
disorder-specific, cognitive distortions are also disorder-specific. That is， 




Dysfunctional schema. The content of dysftuictional schema is 
specific in psychopathology. Li anxiety, the content of the dysfimctional 
schema is related to fear ofphysical or psychological harm or danger (Beck 
& Emery, 1985). When a threat-provoking situation is encountered, such 
as an examination, a dormant dysfunctional schema may be activated, which 
produces automatic negative thoughts and anxiety via a distorted 
information processing. Examples of dysfunctional schemas in ajixiety 
are "Any strange situation shoidd be regarded as dangerous"; "It's always 
best to assume the worst"; and "I have to do everything perfectly" (Beck & 
Emery, 1985, p.64). 
Li depression, the content of the dysfunctional schema is related to 
loss or failure (Beck et. al., 1979). A loss situation such as marriage 
break-down may activate a dormant dysfunctional schema which produces 
automatic thoughts and symptoms of depression via a distorted cognitive 
processing. Examples of dysfimctional schemas in depression are "Li 
order to be happy, I have to be successful in whatever I undertake，’； "H* 
somebody disagrees with me, it means he doesn't like me"; "My worth 
depends on what other people think of me"; and "Jfl make a mistake, it 
means that I am inept" (Beck, 1976, p. 255-256). 
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Li aggression, the content ofthe dysfunctional schema is related to 
unfairness and hostility with an emphasis on immediate personal satisfaction 
rather than future consequences (Beck, Freeman & associates, 1990). 
Thus a rejecting experience to an aggressive individual may activate a 
dormant dysfunctional schema, which produces automatic negative thoughts 
and aggression via a distorted information processing. Examples of 
dysfunctional schemas in aggression are "Force or cunning is the best way 
to get things done"; "We live in ajungIe and the strong person is the one 
who survives"; and “I have been unfairly treated and am entitled to get my 
fair share by whatever means I can" (Beck, Freeman & Associates, 1990， 
p.361). 
Cognitive distortions. There can be two kinds of specificity in 
relation to cognitive distortions. First, different disorders will have 
specific types of cognitive distortions. For example, personalizing appears 
to be specific to depression, while external attribution appears to be specific 
to aggression (Crick & Dodge，1996). Second, the same type of cognitive 
distortion may exist in different disorders, but the event linked to the 
tendency of cognitive distortion is specific. Examples are: (1) A 
successful college student taking an examination is preoccupied with the 
possibility ofhis failing. He imagines that i fhe fails the test，he would be 
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flunk out of the college and becomes a drifter (Beck & Emery, 1985). He 
over-estimates the probability ofthe catastrophic outcome offailing the 
examination, and exaggerates the adverse consequence o f i t With this 
preoccupation, he may feel anxious and tense, he may also have difficulty in 
concentration, or fear oflosing control (catastrophizing in anxiety). (2) A 
student, having failed an examination, believes that it is the end ofhis 
school life. Similarly, he over-estimates the probability ofthe catastrophic 
outcome offailing the examination, and exaggerates the adverse 
consequence ofit. As a result, he may feel depressed or worthless, he may 
also lose interest in his daily activities，or even have difficulty in sleeping 
and eating (catastrophizing in depression). Li these examples, 
catastrophizing tendency can be found in both anxiety and depression, but 
the events linked to this tendency in both conditions are specific. 
Empirical Support ofthe Cognitive Model 
Empirical support in adult population. As the cognitive model was 
first developed in adult patients, early research were mainly focused on 
adult population. 
Deny and Kuiper (Deny and Kuiper, 1981; Kuiper and Deny, 1982) 
proposed that depressed people will recall descriptive adjectives that are 
congruent with the content oftheir dysfunctional schema both more 
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frequently and more quickly than they will recall adjectives that are 
incongruent with their schema. Using this self-reference incidental recall 
paradigm, Derry and Kmper (1981) required depressives and normal control 
to rate whether adjectives in a list of depressed- and nondepressed-content 
words (e.g. hopeless, inferior, versus capable, sociable) described 
themselves. Subjects were unexpectedly asked to recall as many ofthese 
personal adjectives as possible. They found that the clinically depressed 
subjects had enhanced recall ofnegative, self-descriptive adjectives, but not 
positive adjectives. Li contrast, the nondepressed individuals showed the 
reverse pattern. However, these studies had one drawback. Single 
descriptive adjectives may not be able to represent an individual's 
dysfunctional schema clearly. Dysfunctional schema is best represented in 
a sentence with more elaboration (Young，1994). 
Studies testing the cognitive distortions in depressed adults generally 
have found that depressed individuals tended to have significantly more 
cognitive distortions when compared to the nondepressed groups. 
Lefebvre (1981) compared four types of cognitive distortions, namely 
catastrophizing, overgeneralizing, personalizing, and selective abstraction in 
four groups ofpatients: depressed patients, depressed low back pain (LBP) 
patients, nondepressed LBP patients, and normal control by using the 
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Cognitive Error Questionnaire. Results indicated that depressed patients 
with or without LBP displayed significantly more cognitive distortions than 
the control. Li a meta-analytical study. Joiner and Wagner (1995) found 
that internal attribution or personalizing was consistently associated with 
self-reported depression and clinical depression irrespective of age, gender, 
and sample type. 
An over-concentration ofresearch on depression is not unexpected, 
given that Beck's cognitive model originates from psychotherapy with 
emotionally disturbed patients, particularly on depressed patients. 
However, the presence of dysfimctional schema and cognitive distortions in 
depressed adults can only validate the cognitive model in depression. 
Dysfunctional schema and cognitive distortions may be specific to 
depression, or they may be general to all forms of psychopathology. 
Previous studies, which only included a two-group comparison design 
(depressed versus nondepressed groups), is inadequate in testing this 
specificity versus generality issue. A third group of subjects with other 
psychiatric diagnosis is required. 
There are only a handfid of studies which have included a third group 
of subjects with other psychiatric diagnosis to compare with depressed and 
normal subjects. For example, Greenberg and Beck (1989) assessed 
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dysfimctional schema in clinically anxious, depressive, and control groups 
by using a trait-rating and incidental recall paradigm. They found that the 
depressed groupjudged and recalled more negative depression-relevant 
adjectives (e.g. inadequate, weak, lonely, hopeless) than did the anxious and 
control groups. The anxious subjects recalled more negative than positive 
anxiety-relevant adjectives (e.g. nervous, irritable，chaotic, dangerous). 
The depressed subjects, however, also recalled more negative than positive 
anxiety-relevant adjectives. Thus, these findings only provided some 
initial support to the specificity hypothesis related to dysfimctional schema 
for depression, but provided minimal support to the hypothesis for anxiety. 
So far, research on cognitive distortions which includes a third psychiatric 
group is lacking. 
Empirical support in children and adolescent population. Research 
on cognitive factors in children and adolescents have also concentrated on 
studying depression. Hammen and Zupan (1984) investigated 
dysfunctional schema in psychometrically identified depressed and 
nondepressed school children. They found that the nondepressed children 
showed significantly greater recall of positive content self-descriptive 
adjectives than did the depressed children, Li contrast, the depressed 
children tended to recall more negative self-descriptive words, although this 
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was only marginally significant. 
Zupan, Hammen and Jaenicke (1987) tested the paradigm further in a 
sample of children who had current or previous diagnoses of depression in 
order to examine whether the marginally significant findings from the 
previous study had been a fonction ofthe children having less severe 
depression. They found that the clinically depressed children showed 
superior recall for self-referent negative content words, whereas the 
nondepressed children recalled significantly more positive content self-
referent words. Similar to adult literature, research on dysfunctional 
schema in children and adolescents focused on using descriptive adjectives 
to represent an individual's dysfimctional schema. Such single adjectives 
may not represent the dysfunctional schema adequately. A longer 
statement with more elaboration is preferable. 
Comparatively, there are more studies examining cognitive 
distortions in children and adolescents. Haley et al. (1985) used the 
Cognitive Bias Questionnaire for Children (CBCQ) to assess cognitive 
distortions in clinically depressed children. The CBCQ consisted of four 
subscales: depressed-distorted, depressed-nondistorted, nondepressed-
distorted, and nondepressed-nondistorted. The depressed-nondistorted and 
nondepressed-distorted subscales were control for affect and general 
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distortion. The type of cognitive distortions that CBCQ assessed was 
mainly selective abstraction. Results indicated that children with a 
diagnosis ofmajor depression scored significantly higher in the depressed-
distorted subscale than the control. Using another measure of cognitive 
distortions (Children Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire; CNCEQ)， 
Leitenberg and associates (1986) found that children with self-reported 
symptoms of depression displayed significantly more cognitive distortions 
(that is, overgeneralizing, catastrophizing, personalizing, and selective 
abstraction) than the non-depressed group, with the highest score in 
overgeneralizing. Similarly, they found that children who reported more 
evaluation anxiety displayed significantly more cognitive distortions (that is， 
overgeneralizing, catastrophizing, personalizing, and selective abstraction) 
than the low-evaluation-anxiety group, with the highest score in 
overgeneralizing as well. 
Like adult literature, research on the cognitive model in children and 
adolescents have also over-concentrated on depression. The lack of 
research on other disorders will prevent us to elucidate the exact role played 
by dysfunctional schemas and cognitive distortions in the genesis of 
psychopathpology. Besides, it casts doubt on whether dysfunctional 
schemas and cognitive distortions are common to all forms of 
Cognitive Theory 
17 ‘ 
psychopathology or whether they are exclusive and distinctive features of 
depression. 
There are only a couple of studies in the literature which included 
different psychiatric diagnoses for comparisons. Leung and Wong (1998) 
found that adolescents with internalizing problems, and not with 
externalizing problems, were specifically associated with various forms of 
cognitive distortions as measured by the CNCEQ, namely, selective 
abstraction, personalizing, overgeneralizing, and catastrophizing, when 
compared to normal control. 
Kempton and associates (1994) found that clinically depressed 
adolescents displayed greater cognitive distortions as measured by the 
CNCEQ (that is, personalizing, overgeneralizing, catastrophizing, and 
selective abstraction) than those adolescents with conduct disorder and 
substance abuse. Using the same instrument, Messer and associates (1994) 
also found that adolescents with affective disorders (mainly depression) 
showed greater overgeneralizing tendency than those with disruptive 
disorder. 
These studies pointed out that the cognitive model is applicable to 
internalizing problems, that is depression and anxiety, but not extemaHzing 
problems. Lti other words, the cognitive model is only general to emotional 
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disorders. However, as Leung and Wong (1998) pointed out, the CNCEQ 
used in these studies is only sensitive to assess the cognitive distortions 
associated with internalizing problems but not externalizing problems, and 
thus their conclusion has to be qualified Li fact, there are other studies 
which reveal that the cognitive model is also applicable to aggression. 
Dodge and Tomlin (1987) found that aggressive children 
demonstrated a selection bias toward attributing hostile intent to peer 
provocation. Besides, they were significantly less likely than normal 
control to utilize relevant environmental cues in making decisions and were 
more likely to base their decisions on their dysfunctional schema. To 
conclude, the literature review supports the cognitive model is general to 
major forms of disorders, that is，anxiety, depression, and aggression. 
A follow-up study by Dodge and associates provided empirical 
support to the specificity hypothesis, that is, the cognitive variables are 
disorder-specific. QuiggIe, Garber, Panak, and Dodge (1992) found that 
psychometrically identified aggressive and depressed children demonstrated 
different types of cognitive distortions. The depressed children displayed a 
greater tendency to attribute others' hostile intentions to internal, stable, 
global causes (personalizing); while aggressive children were more likely to 




Apparently, these studies reveal that the cognitive model is not only 
restricted to depression，but is also applicable to other disorders, natnely, 
anxiety and aggression. Although cognitive variables have been found to 
be associated with major forms of disorders, the contents ofthe 
dysftmctional schemas and the types of cognitive distortions in some studies 
appear to be different. Li other words, dysfunctional schemas and 
cognitive distortions may be disorder-specific. Besides, there may be 
another kind of specificity in relation to cognitive distortions which previous 
studies have not explored, that is, the specificity of the events linked to 
cognitive distortions . The same type of cognitive distortion may be found 
in different disorders, but the events linked to the distortion are specific. 
Purpose ofthe Present Study 
The present study examines two classes of cognitive variables, that is， 
dysfimctional schemas and cognitive distortions in a community sample of 
adolescents. The purpose of the study is twofold. The first purpose is to 
test the cognitive model in relation to dysfimctional schemas and cognitive 
distortions in three major disorders, namely, anxiety, depression, and 
aggression (Beck et al., 1979; Beck & Emery，1985; Beck, Freeman & 
associates, 1990). The second purpose is to test the specificity of 
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dysfimctional schemas and cognitive distortions to disorders (Clark & Beck, 
1990). Specifically, three types of cognitive distortions, namely, 
personalizing, catastrophizing, and external attribution will be examined. 
Concerning dysfimctional schema, it is postulated that the dominant content 
ofthe dysfimctional schema in anxiety is about physical or psychological 
threat or danger (Beck & Emery，1985). Li depression, it is about personal 
loss or deprivation (Beck et al., 1979; Deny & Kuiper，1981). Whereas in 
aggression, it is about unfairness (Beck, Freeman & associates, 1990). 
Concerning cognitive distortions, it is postulated that personalizing and 
external attribution will be exclusively associated with depression and 
aggression respectively (Joiner & Wagner, 1995; Dodge Sc TomHn, 1987; 
QuiggIe et al., 1992) while catastrophizing will be associated with both 





Participants were Form one (n = 110), Form two (n = 41)，Form three 
(n = 58), and Form four (n = 372) students from five mainstream secondary 
schools in Hong Kong. The percentages of male and female participants 
were 54.1% and 45.9% respectively. Their mean age was 14.7 (S.D.= 
1.39; ranged from 12- to 18-year-old). The questionnaires were distributed 
and collected by their teachers. Standard verbal instructions were given by 
their teachers before the participants filled out the questionnaires. 
Measures 
Dysfunctional Schema Questionnaire (DSQ). The DSQ has been 
developed to measure dysfunctional schemas in anxiety, depression, and 
aggression for the present study. There are total 30 questions assessing the 
dysfimctional schemas in respondents. Items 1 to 10 assess dysfunctional 
schema which are conceptually related to depression, items 11 to 20 assess 
the dysfunctional schemas which are conceptually related to anxiety, and 
items 21 to 30 assess the dysfunctional schema which are conceptually 
related to aggression schema. Among these items, eighteen have come 
from Beck's publications on depression (Beck, 1976), anxiety (Beck & 
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Emery, 1985), and personality disorder (Beck, Freeman, & associates，1990). 
These schemas have been identified by Beck from his patients over his long 
years of clinical experience. Eleven items have come from Young's 
Schema Questionnaire (Young, 1994) which has been found to be 
significantly correlated with depression, anxiety, and antisocial personality 
disorder. One item has come from other source (Clark, 1989) on cognitive 
therapy. A 4-point scale has been assigned to this questionnaire. 
Respondents rated each item from completely untrue (1) to completely true � . 
Cognitive Distortions Questionnaire (CDQ). Li light of the 
potential measurement bias of the CNCEQ (Leung and Wong, 1998) in 
assessing cognitive distortions, a modified and expanded version of the 
instrument, that is the CDQ has been developed for the present study. 
Situations involving threat and danger have been included in order to 
measure the anxiety-related cognitive distortions. Similarly, situations 
containing elements of conflicts and hostility have also been included in 
order to assess the aggression-related cognitive distortions. 
The CDQ is a self-report questionnaire which contains three core 
subtypes of cognitive distortions, namely, personalizing or internal 
attribution, catastrophizing, and external attribution. It contains 54 items. 
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Each item contains a vignette and an automatic negative thought which 
represents the outcome of one ofthe three subtypes of cognitive distortions. 
Respondents were asked to rate the similarity of each automatic negative 
thought in the questionnaire to their own thought when they imagined being 
in that situation. A 5-point scale is assigned to each item ranging from 
almost exactly like I would think (1) to not at all like I would think (5). 
Examples of some of these items are given below: 
-You have lost a badminton contest. You think, "I'm not good at athlete. I 
won't take part in athletic contest any more." (catastrophizing in depression) 
-Your class is having 4-person relay race in gym class. Your team loses. 
You think, ‘Tflhadjust been faster we would not have lost." (personaUzing in 
depression) 
-You join a orienteering contest with your friends. Your team loses. Your 
think, '^*my fiiends know the compass weU, I won't lose." (external 
attribution in depression) 
-You forgot to bring your EngUsh homework to school. Now your teacher 
teUs the class to hand them in . You think, 'The teacher is going to think I 
have not done my homework and I won't pass the EngUsh exam" 
(catastrophizing in anxiety) 
-You invite one ofyour fiiends to have dinner at home. Your another fiiend 
know about it. You think, '1 am going to make him/her angry. This is aU 
my fauh: ofnot inviting him." (personalizing in anxiety) 
-Your gymnastic team is having practice. The coach teUs you he /she would 
Hke to taUt to you after practice. You think, 'He/she is going to scold me 
fiercely. My performance is akeady up to standard. He/she only makes 
fusswith it." (external attribution in anxiety) 
-After morning assembly, a big guy teUs you that he has something to do and 
asks you to take his school bag to classroom. You think, 'He buUies me 
because he's bigger than me. This is reaUy a dog-eat-dog society." 
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(catastrophizing in aggression) 
-Today when you are leaving school, you see three guys waUdng towards you. 
They keep looking at you from head to toe. You think, ‘They look hostile to 
me. Must be because I have looked at them first." (personaUzing in 
aggression) 
-You havejust bought a cartoon book and you keep reading it while waUdng 
on the street. You accidentaUy knock into an old lady. You think, ‘This is 
not my fault. She's too old to walk smartly in street." (external attribution 
in aggression) 
Items 1 to 18 assess cognitive distortions which are conceptually 
related to aggression, items 19 to 36 assess cognitive distortions which are 
conceptually related to depression, while items 37 to 54 assess cognitive 
distortions which are conceptually related to anxiety. Three types of 
cognitive distortions (personalizing, catastrophizing, and external attribution) 
will be examined in each of these three disorders, which thus make up of a 
total ofnine subscales in the CDQ. Among these nine subscales, three 
measure aggression-related cognitive distortions (pertaining to 
catastrophizing, personalizing, and external attribution), three measure 
depression-related cognitive distortions, and three measure anxiety-related 
cognitive distortions. 
Costello-Comrev Awcietv Scale (CCAS; Costello & Comrey, 1967). 
The CCAS is a 9-item anxiety scale measuring current level of anxiety 
symptomatology. For each item, respondents indicate how frequently they 
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have experienced that symptom during the past month on a 4-point Likert 
scale ranging from rarely or none of the time (1) to most or all of the time 
(4). High CCAS scores reflect more anxiety symptoms. A split-half 
reliability of .70 was reported for a university sample and test-retest 
reliability of .72 was observed for the CCAS scores ofpsychiatric patients 
obtained at admission and again at discharge (Costello and Comrey, 1967). 
Though CCAS was originally used in adults, it was found to be also 
applicable to adolescents (aged 12 to 19) in a local study (Lo, 1994) with a 
coefficient alphas of.84 in the younger adolescent group (aged 12 to 14), 
and .80 in the older group (aged 15 to 19). 
Depression Self-Rating Scale (DSRS; Birleson, 1981). The DSRS is 
an instrument designed specifically to measure depression in children 
between the ages of 7 and 13. Respondents are requested to indicate their 
choice from Never (3) to Most of the time (1) on a 3-point Likert scale. 
The DSRS contains 18 items that refer to affective, physiological, somatic， 
cognitive and behavioural symptoms of depression. Ln order to avoid bias 
due to response set, some items are phrased positively such that 
endorsement reflects the presence of depressive symptoms, whereas other 
items were negatively worded such that endorsement indicates the absence 
ofthe symptoms. Total depression scores were calcidated by summing the 
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respondents' scores on the 18-items. Possible scores range from 0 to 36, 
with higher scores indicating a greater level or severity of depressive 
symptoms. 
Asamow and Carlson (1985) reported that DSRS demonstrated good 
concurrent validity correlating .81 (p<001) with the Children's Depression 
Liventory (CDI). The DSRS was regarded as an alternative to the CDI for 
assessing children's depression (Asamow and Carlson, 1985) because of its 
shorter and simpler format, in which subjects were not required to select one 
sentence from a series ofthree sentences that have to be considered 
simultaneously. Though DSRS was originally standardized on a sample of 
7 to 13 years old children (Birleson, 1981), it had also been found 
applicable to non-clinical sample ofteenagers aged 11 to 15 years (So, 
1994). However, when being used in adolescents, some modifications 
have to be made. As Firth and Chaplin (1987) pointed out, one item was 
clearly inappropriate to the older age group: "I like to go out to play". This 
item was modified in this study to "I like to seek fim". Two additional 
items were also included in this study in order to provide a wider coverage 
of depressive disorders. They are "I have suicidal ideation" and "I have 
less interest in sex". This modified Chinese version of the DSRS had been 
used in a local sample of adolescents aged from 11 to 15 with satisfactory 
Cognitive Theory 
27 ‘ 
reliability (alpha=.75; So, 1994). 
Youth Self Report Form - Aggression subscale (YSR-A; Achenbach， 
1991a). The YSR is designed to be self-administered by adolescents aged 
11-18. It contains eight problem subscales, five of which can be 
subgrouped further into two broad-band categories，namely, internalizing 
and externalizing problems. Extensive evidence has been presented for the 
reliability and validity ofthe YSR (Achenbach, 1991). The Aggression 
subscale ofthe externalizing category which is consisted of 19 items had 
been used in the present study. Each item was scored 0 to 2，i.e., (0) not 
true; (1) somewhat or sometimes true; (2) vefy true or often true. A high 




The results are presented in three major sections. First, the 
psychometric properties of the instruments were examined. The 
coefficient alpha of each measure wouU be presented. The factor structure 
ofthe newly developed instruments were also explored. Second, the 
correlation matrix of all variables was presented. Li section three, 
hierarchical regression analyses were performed between various forms of 
dysfunctional schemas, cognitive distortions and disorders, that is, anxiety, 
depression, and aggression. 
Psychometric Properties 
1. Reliabilities 
Table 1 presented the residts ofthe reliabilities in terms of coefficient 
alpha of each instrument. As shown by the table, the reliabilities of the 
instruments ranged from .61 to .94. The coefficient alphas ofthe subscales 
ofthe two newly constructed questionnaires, namely. Dysfunctional Schema 
Questionnaire (DSQ) and Cognitive Distortion Questionnaire (CDQ), 




Coefficient Alpha ofMstruments 




Depression Schema .63 10 
Anxiety Schema .70 10 
Aggression Schema .81 10 
Cognitive Distortions 
Questionnaire Depression Distortion 
1. PersonaUzing .80 6 
2. Catastrophizing .75 6 
3. External Attribution .83 6 
Anxiety Distortion 
1. PersonaUzing .78 6 
2. Catastrophizing .76 6 
3. External Attribution .80 6 
Aggression Distortion 
1. PersonaHzing .61 6 
2. Catastrophizing .69 6 
3. External Attribution .73 6 
CosteUo-Conu-ey Anxiety Scale .80 9 
Depression Setf-Rating Scale .75 20 
Youth SdfReport Aggression subscale .86 19 
Cognitive Theory 
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2. Factor Structure 
The factor structures ofthe three questionnaires, namely, DSQ，CDQ, 
and DSRS were examined. The statistical procedure ofprincipal-
components analysis (PCA) in exploratory factor analysis was used in 
exploring the factor structures ofthese three questionnaires. To enhance 
the interpretability ofthe factor solution, an orthogonal rotation procedure 
(varimax) was chosen. Items which loaded > .30 on a given factor were 
assigned to that factor. Items which loaded on two or more factors were 
assigned to the factor on which they loaded most highly. 
Dysfunctional Schema Questionnaire (DSQ). Three factors were 
hypothesized to be existed in the DSQ. Inspection of the scree plot also 
suggested that a three-component solution was appropriate. A PCA was 
then computed with a forced three-component solution which resulted in 
three components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The first component 
accounted for the majority of the variance (20.2%). The remaining two 
components accounted for 7.5% and 5.6% variance respectively, making up 




Factor Loadings ofItems ofthe Dysfunctional Schema Questionnaire (DSO) 

















15 .40 .39 














29 .60 .31 
^ ^ M  
DSQ: Dysfunctional Schema Questionnaire 
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Lispection of specific items comprising the three empirically derived 
components offered preliminary support to the hypothesized item/subscale 
groupings. Items 21 to 30 (except item 24) which theoretically measure 
aggression schema loaded neatly on the first component, and it was named 
as aggression schema accordingly. Items 11 to 20 (with the exception of 
items 13 and 14) loaded on the second factor which theoretically assess 
anxiety schema, and it was thus named as anxiety schema. Items 1 to 6 
which theoretically measure depression schema loaded on the third 
component, which was then named as depression schema. However, the 
other four items (items 7 to 10) which were also supposed to assess 
depression schema loaded on the second factor of anxiety schema. 
A correlational analysis was performed between the theoretically-
and empirically-derived subscales of dysfimctional schemas in order to 
assess their strength of association (Table 3). 
The correlation coefficients between the empirically- and 
theoretically-derived subscales of anxiety schema, depression schema， 
and aggression schema ranged from .82 to .96 (p < .001), with a median 
of.96, indicating that they were strongly associated with each other. It 




Correlations Between TheoreticaUy- and EmpiricaUy-Derived Subscales ofthe 
Dysfimctional Schema Ouestiomiaire 






Axschema(t): TheoreticaUy- derived anxiety schema 
(items 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20) 
Axschema(e): EmpiricaUy-derived anxiety schema 
(items 7,8,9,10,11,12,15,16,17,18,19,20) 
Deschema(t): TheoreticaUy-derived depression schema 
(items 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10) 
Deschema(e): EmpiricaUy-derived depression schema 
(items 1,2,3,4,5,6) 
Agschema(t): TheoreticaUy-derived aggression schema 
(items21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30) 




dysfimctionai schemas in the subsequent statistical analyses. 
Cognitive Distortion Questionnaire (CDQ). Three groups of 
disorder-related cognitive distortions were hypothesized to exist in CDQ, 
that is, the aggression-related, depression-related, and anxiety-related 
cognitive distortions. Within each disorder, three subtypes of cognitive 
distortions were constructed, namely, personalizing, external attribution, 
and catastrophizing, thus making up of a total of nine subscales. A PCA 
was then computed with a forced nine-component solution which resulted in 
nine components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. These nine 
components accounted for 51.7% ofthe total variance (Table 4). 
The nine-factor solution corresponded to the nine hypothetical 
subscales grossly except that items which theoretically measured anxiety 
external attribution and anxiety catastrophizing loaded on one single factor. 
These nine factors were then named according to the theoretical constructs 
they intended to measure, that is, anxiety personalizing, anxiety 
catastrophizing, anxiety external attribution, depression catastrophizing, 
depression personalizing, depression external attribution，aggression 





Factor Loadings ofItems of the Cognitive Distortions Questionnaire 
Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 5 Items Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 Factor 9 
Axper Agper 
37 .47 1 .68 
42 .53 5 .51 
46 .61 7 .50 
49 .58 11 .40 
51 .63 16 .50 
54 .52 18 .36 
Axcat Agcat 
38 .66 3 .33 
39 .47 .31 4 .63 
41 .60 8 .76 
43 .37 10 .48 
47 .56 13 .47 
48 .36 .48 17 .41 
Axexat Agexat 
40 .68 2 
44 .66 .32 6 .43 
45 .42 .38 .42 9 .65 
50 .57 12 .60 
52 .46 .43 14 .63 
53 .45 .36 15 .56 
(Table 4 to be continued on next page) 
Note: 
Factor 4 has been omitted in this part of the table as no item of these 6 subscales 
loaded on this factor. 
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20 .38 .46 
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30 .46 .44 










Axper: Anxiety personaHzing Deexat: Depression external attribution 
Axcat: Anxiety catastrophizing Agper: Aggression personaUzing 
Axexat: Anxiety external attribution Agcat: aggression catastrophizing 
Deper: Depression personaHzing Agexat: Aggression external attribution 
Decat: Depression catastrophizing 
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A correlational analysis was performed between the theoretically-
and empirically-derived subscales of cognitive distortions ofthe three 
disorders in order to assess their strength of association. The correlation 
coefficients between the empirically- and theoretically-derived subscales of 
anxiety-related, depression-related, and aggression-related cognitive 
distortions ranged from .85 to 1.00 (^<.001), with a median of .94 (Table 5). 
These results showed that the empirically- and theoretically-derived 
subscales of cognitive distortions of the three disorders were strongly 
correlated with each other. It was thus decided to use the theoretically-
derived subscales in the subsequent statistical analyses. 
Depression SelfRating Scale (DSRS). A 2-factor solution was 
indicated by the scree plot to be more appropriate. Their eigenvalues were 
3.7 and 2.7. These two factors accounted for 18.3% and 13.7% of total 
variance respectively. On examining the factor loadings ofthe items，it 
was found that negatively worded and positively worded items loaded 
separately on these two factors (factors 1 and 2 respectively), which were 
named as dysphoria and hedonia subscales respectively. One of the 
additional items, item 20, did not load on any ofthese subscale (Table 6). 
The coefficient alphas ofhedonia subscale was .71, and of dysphoria 





Correlations Between TheoreticaUy- and Kmpirically-Derived Subscales of 
Cognitive Distortions Questionnaire 












Axcat(t): TheoreticaUy-derived anxiety catastrophizing 
(items38,39,41,43,47,48) 
Axcat(e): EmpiricaUy-derived anxiety catastrophizing 
(items 38,39,40,41,43,44,45,52) 
Axper(t): TheoreticaUy-derived anxiety personaUzing 
(items37,42,46,49,51,54) 
Axper(e): EmpiricaUy-derived anxiety personaUzing 
(items 37,42,45,46,47,48,49,51,52,54) 
Axexat(t): TheoreticaUy-derived anxiety external attribution 
(items 40,44,45,50,52,53) 
Axexat(e): Enq)iricaUy-derived anxiety external attribution 
(items 38,39,40,41,43,44,50,53) 
Decat(t): TheoreticaUy-derived depression catastrophizing 
(items20,25,26,30,31,34) 
Decat(e): EmpiricaUy-derived depression catastrophizing 
(items26,30,31,45) 




Deper(e): Enq)iricaUy-derived depression personaHzing 
(items 19,21,24,27,32,33) 
Deexat(t): TheoreticaUy-derived depression external attribution 
(items22,23,28,29,35,36) 
Deexat(e): EmpiricaUy-derived depression external attribution 
(items 22,23,28,29,35,36) 
Agcat(t): TheoreticaUy-derived aggression catastrophizing 
(items3，4,8，10，13,17) 
Agcat(e): EmpiricaUy-derived aggression catastrophizing 
(items3,4,5,8,10,41) 
Agper(t): TheoreticaUy-derived aggression personaUzing 
(items 1,5,7,11,16,18) 
Agper(e): En^iricaUy-derived aggression personaUzing 
(itemsl,7,ll,16,18) 
Agexat(t): TheoreticaUy-derived aggression external attribution 
(items2,6,9,12,14,15) 





Factor Structure ofDepression SetfRating Scale 
Depression SdfRating Scale Factor 1 Factor 2 
I.1 look forward to things as much as I used to .57 
2.1 sleep very weU .57 
6.1 have lots of energy .57 
7.1 enjoy my food .50 
9.1 can stick up for mysdf ,62 
10.1 enjoy the things I do as much as I used to .56 
II .1 Eke taUdng with my family .39 
14.1 am easity cheered up .59 
16.1 am good at things I do .54 
18.1 Uke to go out to play .59 
3.1 feel Uke crying .65 
4.1 feel Uke nmning away .65 
5.1 get tummy aches .45 
8.1 think Hfe isn't worth Uving .57 
12.1 have horrible dreams .39 
13.1 feel very lonely • 67 
15.1 feel so sad I can hardly stand it .64 
17.1 feel very bored .67 
19.1 have suicidal ideation .67 
20.1 have less interest in sex 
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Previous study by Birleson, Hudson, Buchanan, and Wolff(1987) 
found that only the dysphoria subscale ofDSRS was significantly related to 
clinical depression. Jn view ofthis, the dysphoria subscale was used in the 
subsequent statistical analysis. 
Correlational Analysis 
Results ofPearson correlations between dysfunctional schemas, 
cognitive distortions and disorders were showti in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Correlations between Dysfimctional Schemas. Cognitive Distortions and Disorders 
CCAS DSRS YSR 
Axcat .42*** .31*** .25** 
Axper .33*** .25*** .21** 
Axexat .36*** .29*** .29** 
Decat .41*** .38*** .28** 
Deper .31*** .23*** .20** 
Deexat .28*** .17*** .23** 
Agcat .27*** .11** .20** 
Agper .20*** .09* .10* 
Agexat .25*** .21*** .29** 
Axschema .47*** .30*** .28** 
Deschema .36*** .26*** .23** 
Agschema .39*** .26*** .37** 
*n<.05; **£<01; ***£<.001 
Note. 
Axper: Anxiety personaHzing Deexat: Depression external attribution 
Axcat: Anxiety catastrophizing Agcat: aggression catastrophizing 
Axexat: Anxiety external attribution Agexat: Aggression external attribution 
Deper: Depression personaHzing Deschema: Depression schema 
Decat: Depression catastrophizing Axschema: Anxiety schema 
Agper: Aggression personaHzing Agschema: Aggression schema 
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Li the present study, a more conservative p-value (£ < .01) was 
adopted in statistical analysis, because ofthe large number of correlations 
performed. This significance level is set in order to provide more 
protection against a type I error _— of rejecting a nuU hypothesis that should 
have been accepted. The result ofthe correlation analysis indicated that 
nearly all dysfimctionai schemas and cognitive distortions correlated 
significantly with all the three disorders, which provided empirical support 
to the cognitive model. On the contrary, such indiscriminate correlations 
cast doubts on the specificity hypothesis. 
Hierarchical Regression Analyses 
Such findings in correlational study might be related to the 
correlations among the variables. Anxiety, depression, and aggression had 
known to be moderately correlated Li the present study, the correlation 
coefficients between anxiety and depression was .41 (^ < .001)，between 
ajixiety and aggression was .42 (p < .001), and between depression and 
aggression was .35 (p < .001). The dysfunctional schemas were also 
moderately correlated with each other (ranged from .38 to .52; p < .001). 
Various subtypes of cognitive distortions themselves were also significantly 
correlated with each other (ranged from .27 to .76; p < .001). 
As the three types of disorders were correlated with each other, the 
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correlations between dysfunctional schemas and cognitive distortions with 
one specific disorder are perhaps due to the correlations among the disorders. 
For example in anxiety, the correlations between anxiety and the 
dysfunctional schemas and cognitive distortions may be due to the former's 
correlation with depression and aggression. This correlation confounded 
the interpretation ofthe above findings; it was uncertain how far the 
relationships between anxiety and dysfunctional schemas and cognitive 
distortions (including those that are theoretically related to depression and 
aggression) were accounted for by the former's correlation with depression 
and aggression. 
A series ofhierarchical regression analyses were thus conducted. 
The first step is to partial out the effect of the correlated disorders 
(depression and aggression) on the relationship between anxiety on one 
hand and dysfunctional schemas and cognitive distortions on the other. 
The second step in the regression analysis is to test whether aggression-
related and depression-related dysfunctional schemas and cognitive 
distortions can still predict anxiety after the effect of correlation between 
depression / aggression and anxiety have been partiaIled out. The third 
step is test whether anxiety schema and anxiety-related cognitive distortions 
have any unique contribution in predicting anxiety after the effects of 
Cognitive Theory 
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depression-related and aggression-related dysfunctional schemas and 
cognitive distortions are also partialled out in the second step. The same 
procedure applies to the regression analyses with depression atid aggression 
as dependent variables. 
I. Anxiety Symptoms 
Table 8 presents the intermediate estimates ofR^ and F change in 
each step ofthe hierarchical regression and the final estimates ofTvalue 
and standardized regression coefficients (Beta) in predicting anxiety 
symptoms (CCAS). 
At step 1, DSRS atid YSR were entered as a block with the purpose to 
partial out the effect oftheir correlations with CCAS. The R^ was .25, F 
change was 97.32 (p < .001) 
At step 2，dysfimctional schemas of depression and aggression 
(Deschema, and Agschema), and their related cognitive distortions (Deper, 
Decat, Deexat, Agper, Agcat, and Agexat) were entered as a block in order 
2 
to partial out their correlations with CCAS. The R was .36, F change was 
II.93(p<.001). 
At step 3，anxiety schema (Axschema) and anxiety-related cognitive 
2 




Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Anxiety from Correlated Disorders. 
Dysfimctional Schemas and Cognitive Distortions 
Predictors R? F Change Final Estimates 
1 ^ T ~" 
Step 1 ~25 97.32*** 
DSRS .16 4.11*** 
YSR .21 5 74*** 
Step2 .36 11.93*** 
Deschema .06 1.50 
Agschema .08 1.89 
Deper .03 .69 
Decat .10 1.83 
Deexat .00 -.09 
Agper .01 .43 
Agcat .03 .82 
Agexat .04 -2.04* 
Step 3 .41 10.93*** 
Axschema .22 5.24*** 
Axcat .17 2.95** 
Axper -.02 -.37 
Axexat ^ ^  
*£<.05; **^<.01; ***^<001 ‘ 
Note. 
DSRS: Depression Setf-Rating Scale 
YSR: Aggression subscale ofYouth SdfReport 
Axper: Anxiety personaUzing 
Axcat: Anxiety catastrophizing 
Axexat: Anxiety external attribution 
Deper: Depression personaHzing 
Decat: Depression catastrophizing 
Deexat: Depression external attribution 
Agper: Aggression personaHzing 
Agcat: Aggression catastrophizing 
Agexat: Aggression external attribution 
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was .41, F change was 10.93 (p_< .001). The final statistics revealed that 
aggression-related external attribution (Agexat) predicted CCAS at .05 level 
r% 
(T_= -2.04, p < .05). The R change at step 3 was .05, which means that 
after partialling out the many correlated variables, the anxiety schema and 
anxiety-related cognitive distortions still contributed 5% of unique variance 
to the total variance in the prediction of CCAS. Among these variables, 
anxiety schema (T 二 5.24, p < .001) and anxiety-related catastrophizing (T = 
2.95, p < .01) were found to be two significant predictors of CCAS. 
2. Depression Symptoms. 
^_ 勺 
Table 9 presents the intermediate estimates o f R and F change in 
each step ofthe hierarchical regression and the final estimates of T value 
and standardized regression coefficients (Beta) in predicting depression 
symptoms (DSRS). 
At step 1, CCAS and YSR were entered as a block. The purpose 
2 was to partial out the effect of their correlations with DSRS. The R 
was .20，F change was 72.86 (p < .001). 
At step 2, dysfunctional schemas of anxiety and aggression 
(Axschema, and Agschema), and their related cognitive distortions (Axper, 
Axcat, Axexat, Agper, Agcat, and Agexat) were entered as a block in order 
2 




Multiple Regression Analvsis Predicting Depression from Correlated Disorders. 
Dvsfimctional Schemas and Cognitive Distortions 
Predictors R? F Change Final Estimates 
1 ^ f 
Step 1 .20*** 72.86*** 
CCAS .19 4.11*** 
YSR .16 3.92*** 
Step 2 .24*** 3.71*** 
Axschema 08 1.75 
Agschema .04 .91 
Axper -.02 -.41 
Axcat .04 .66 
Axexat .04 .63 
Agper -.07 -1.59 
Agcat -.14 -2.95** 
Agexat .05 .95 
Step 3 .29*** 8.56*** 
Deschema .01 .30 
Decat .31 5.29*** 
Deper .05 .98 
Deexat -.12 -2.06* 
*2 < .05; **£ < .01; ***£<001 
Note. 
CCAS: CosteUo-Comrey Anxiety Scale 
YSR: Aggression subscale ofYouth SdfReport 
Axper: Anxiety personaHzing 
Axcat: Anxiety catastrophizing 
Axexat: Anxiety external attribution 
Deper: Depression personaHzing 
Decat: Depression catastrophizing 
Deexat: Depression external attribution 
Agper: Aggression personaUzing 
Agcat: Aggression catastrophizing 




At step 3，depression schema (Deschema) and depression-related 
cognitive distortions (Deper, Decat, and Deexat) were entered as a block. 
The R^ was .29, F change was 8.56 (p < .001). was .04 (j^< .001). The 
final statistics revealed that aggression-related catastrophizing (Agcat) 
predicted DSRS (1 = -2.95，p < .01). The R^ change at step 3 was .04， 
which means that after partialling out the many correlated variables, the 
depression schema and depression-related cognitive distortions still 
contributed about 4% ofunique variance to the total variance in the 
prediction of DSRS. Among these variables, only depression-related 
catastrophizing (Decat) significantly predicted DSRS (1 = 5.29, p < .001), 
and depression-related external attribution (Deexat) marginally predicted 
DSRS( l = -2.06,p<.05). 
3. Aggression Symptoms. 
rs   
Table 10 presents the intermediate estimates o f R and F change in 
each step ofthe hierarchical regression and the final estimates o fT value 
and standardized regression coefficients (Beta) in predicting aggression 
symptoms (YSR-A). 
At step 1, DSRS and CCAS were entered as a block The purpose 




Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Aggression from Correlated Disorders. 
Dysfimctional Schemas and Cognitive Distortions 
Predictors R? F Change Final Estimates 
Beta T 
Step 1 .21*** 77.54*** 
CCAS .26 5.75*** 
DSRS .16 3.92*** 
Step 2 .24*** 2.33* 
Axschema .00 .01 
Deschema .00 -.22 
A^er .02 .25 
Axcat -.12 -1.80 
Axexat .12 1.85 
Deper .05 1.03 
Decat .01 .15 
Deexat -.04 -.69 
Step 3 27*** 6.65*** 
Agschema .17 3.67*** 
Agcat -.02 -.40 
Agper -.05 -1.12 
Agexat .JA 2.70** 
*£<.05; **£<.01; ***^<.001 
Note 
CCAS: CosteUo-Comrey Anxiety Scale 
DSRS: Depression SdfRating Scale 
Axper : Anxiety personaHzing 
Axcat: Anxiety catastrophizing 
Axexat: Anxiety external attribution 
Deper: Depression personaUzing 
Decat: Depression catastrophizing 
Deexat: Depression external attribution 
Agper: Aggression personaHzing 
Agcat: Aggression catastrophizing 
Agexat: Aggression external attribution 
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was .21，F change was 77.54 (£ < .001). 
At step 2，dysfimctionai schemas ofdepression and anxiety (Deschema, 
and Axschema), and their related cognitive distortions (Deper, Decat, 
Deexat, Axper, Axcat, and Axexat) were entered as a block in order to 
2 
partial out their correlations from YSR-A. The R was .24, F change was 
2 .33^< .05 ) . 
At step 3, aggression schema (Agschema) and aggression-related 
cognitive distortions (Agper, Agcat, and Agexat) were entered as a block. 
The final statistics revealed that only the aggression-related variables were 
significant predictors ofaggression. The R^ change at step 3 was .03， 
which means that after partialling out the many correlated variables, the 
aggression schema and aggression-related cognitive distortions still 
contributed about 3% of unique variance to the total variance in the 
prediction of YSR-A. Among these variables, aggression schema (T = 
3.67, p < .001) and aggression-related external attribution (T = 2.70, p < .01) 
were found to be two significant predictors of YSR-A. 
Li summary，after controlling for the many correlated variables, the 
unique variance accounted for by dysfimctionai schemas and cognitive 
distortions to the total variance in predicting their relevant disorders still 
accounted for about 3% to 5% (5% in anxiety, 4% in depression and, 3% in 
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aggression). This provided empirical support to the specificity hypothesis 
ofthe cognitive model. 
Gender Difference 
The same hierarchical regression analyses were repeated across 
gender (Table 11). Similar patterns of findings were revealed with only a 
few exceptions. First, anxiety-related catastrophizing (Axcat) was found 
to be a significant predictor of anxiety in boys only (T = 3.96，p <001). 
Second, aggression-related catastrophizing (Agcat) was found not to be a 
significant predictor ofdepression in boys and girls separately (p > .01). 
Third, aggression-related schema (Agschema) was found to be a significant 
predictor ofaggression in girls only (T = 3.30, p <.001), and aggression-
related external attribution (Agexat) was found not to be a significant 
predictor of aggression in boys and girls separately (^ > .01). ffthe more 
traditional, less stringent alpha value of.05 is adopted to judge statistical 
significance, then arixiety-related catastrophizing (Axcat), anxiety-related 
external attribution (Axexat), depression-related catastrophizing (Decat), 
depression-related personalizing (Deper), aggression-related catastrophizing 
(Agcat), and aggression-related external attribution (Agexat) will be re-
considered as significant predictors. This re-consideration further reduces 




Comparisons of Significant Predictors of Anxiety. Depression, and Aggression 
across Gender 
Dependent Sex Significant Final Estimates in Hierarchical 
Variables Predictors Regression Analysis  
Be^ T  
Anxiety Boys Axschema .23 3.95*** 
Axcat .31 3.96*** 
Decat .16 2.20* 
Girls Axschema .21 3.23** 
Depression Boys Decat .28 2.83** 
Girls Decat .23 2.68** 
Deper .17 2.21* 
Agcat - 1 7 -2.40* 
Aggression Boys Axcat - 2 0 -2.22* 
Axexat .21 2.34* 
Agexat 13 1.96 
(E=.05) 
Girls Agschema .24 3.30** 
Agexat .16 1.97 
fe-05) 
*£ < .05; **£ < .01; ***^<001 
Note 
Axschema: Anxiety schema 
Axcat: Anxiety catastrophizing 
Axexat: Anxiety external attribution 
Decat: Depression catastrophizing 
Deper: Depression personaHzing 
Agschema: Aggression schema 




There are two purposes ofthe present study. The first purpose is to 
test the cognitive model in a community sample ofadolescents, such that 
dysfimctional schemas and cognitive distortions are significantly associated 
with disorders. The second purpose is to test the specificity of 
dysfunctional schemas and cognitive distortions to disorders. The 
dysfunctional schemas purportedly measured by the Dysfunctional Schema 
Questionnaire (DSQ) have been derived from Beck's theories of depression, 
anxiety, and antisocial personality disorder; whereas the cognitive 
distortions pxuportedly measured by the Cognitive Distortions 
Questionnaire (CDQ) have been newly constructed for the present study and 
which are based on Beck's theories and the Children's Negative Cognitive 
Error Questionnaire (CNCEQ; Leitenberg et al., 1986). 
The majority ofprevious studies in adult samples as well as in 
children and adolescent samples have concentrated on studying the 
cognitive model in one disorder (mainly depression) by using a two-group 
comparison design (that is, depressive versus normal control). The results 
thus obtained are only able to verify the cognitive model in depression, but 
are inadequate in addressing whether the dysfunctional schema and 
cognitive distortions are specific to depression or whether they are general 
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to all forms of psychopathology. 
A handM of studies in children and adolescents have included a 
multiplicity of diagnoses for comparison，mainly anxiety and aggression, 
and have confirmed that the cognitive model is also applicable to these two 
disorders. The contents ofthe dysfunctional schemas in some ofthese 
studies appear to be disorder-specific. That is, the contents ofthe 
dysfunctional schemas vary with different psychological disorders. One 
study (QuiggIe, et. al., 1992) supports the specificity of types of cognitive 
distortions to disorders. They found that external attribution is specific to 
aggression, while personalizing is specific to depression. Nevertheless, 
these studies are still inadequate in addressing the specificity of cognitive 
distortions to disorders. There can be another kind of specificity in 
relation to cognitive distortions: the same type of cognitive distortion may 
exist in different disorders, but the events linked to the distortion are 
specific. The present study examined the cognitive model as well as the 
specificity hypothesis with respect to dysfimctional schemas and cognitive 




Psvchometric properties ofinstruments 
DSQ. The reliability in terms of coefficient alphas of the subscales 
of DSQ is satisfactory. Factor analyses of DSQ largely match the 
theoretically derived dysfunctional schemas. The strong correlations 
between the empirically- and the theoretically-derived subscales ofDSQ 
mean that the theoretical subscales are still significant in measuring the 
hypothetical constructs. 
CDQ. The reliability in terms of coefficient alphas of the subscales 
of CDQ is satisfactory. Factor analyses of CDQ largely match the 
theoretically derived cognitive distortions. Although two subscales in 
CDQ loaded on one single factor, that is, the anxiety catastrophizing and 
anxiety external attribution subscales, it may not imply the non-separability 
ofthese two constructs. An examination ofthe items comprising these two 
subscales reveals some clues. 
It appears that the anxiety catastrophizing and anxiety external 
attribution subscales measure a general tendency of catastrophizing in both 
conditions. The automatic negative thought which represents the outcome 
of catastrophizing in ajixiety is a result of an over-estimation of the negative 
consequences of an event, whereas the automatic negative thought which 
represents the outcome ofextemal attribution in anxiety is also a result ofan 
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over-estimation ofthe negative consequences of an event，but to which the 
individual attributes to other people's fault. 
Similar to the DSQ, the strong correlations between the empirically-
and the theoretically-derived subscales of CDQ mean that the theoretical 
subscales are still significant in measuring the hypothetical constructs. 
The imperfect match between empirical data and theoretical constructs is 
considered acceptable. Perhaps, it indicates that the instruments are not 
totally successful in isolating the theoretical constructs in the current format. 
Refinement ofthe instruments may provide a clearer pattern of resxdts. 
DSRS. The present findings on factor analysis of the DSRS 
generally replicate previous studies. Birleson, Hudson, Buchanan, and 
Wolff (1987) have found three factors in DSRS. Among these three 
factors, one factor is related to dysphoria which has been shown to be 
significantly related to depression status. An examination of items in this 
dysphoria subscale reveals that they are negatively worded. With the 
exception of item 5 “I get tummy aches", they are exactly the items which 
load on the dysphoria subscale in the present study. Thus this subscale is 
used in the statistical analysis. 
Empirical Support to the Cognitive Model 
The present study provides empirical support to the validity ofBeck's 
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cognitive model. According to Beck, (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979; 
Beck & Emery, 1985), the interaction among dysfunctional schemas, 
cognitive distortions, and external events produces automatic negative 
thoughts and psychological disturbances. This model is supposed to be 
applicable to all forms of psychopathology. The correlational analysis 
supports the validity of the cognitive model. It shows that the three 
disorders, natnely, anxiety, depression, and aggression, are significantly 
associated with all dysfunctional schemas and nearly all types ofcognitive 
distortions. Such findings are consistent with previous studies which show 
that dysfunctional schemas and cognitive distortions are significant 
predictors ofpsychological disorders. 
On the surface, these findings appear to negate the specificity 
hypothesis. All dysfunctional schemas are found to be correlated 
significantly with all disorders, which means that aiudety schema can 
predict anxiety, as well as depression and aggression; depression schema 
can predict depression, as well as anxiety and aggression; and aggression 
schema can also predict aggression, as well as depression and anxiety. 
Similarly, all subtypes of cognitive distortions seem to predict all the three 
disorders. 
It is possible that such phenomenon is due to the spurious relationship 
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among the dysfimctionai schemas, cognitive distortions and the various 
disorders. The hierarchical regression analyses clarify the picture and 
confirm the specificity hypothesis. Treating anxiety as the dependent 
variable, the hierarchical regression analysis shows that after partialling out 
the effect ofthe correlated disorders, that is, depression and aggression, 
those dysfunctional schemas and cognitive distortions theoretically linked to 
these correlated disorders could no longer predict anxiety. Mstead，anxiety 
schema and anxiety-related cognitive distortions significantly predict 
anxiety. Similar patterns of resuks have been found with depression and 
aggression. 
Anxiety schema and aggression schema have been found to be specific 
in predicting anxiety and aggression respectively even when competing with 
their related cognitive distortions in regression analyses. Such findings 
provide empirical support to Beck's content-specificity hypothesis that 
dysfimctionai schema is disorder-specific. However, the present study 
reveals that depression schema is not a strong predictor of depression when 
competing with depression-related cognitive distortions in regression 
analysis despite the significant correlations between them. 
In assessing the relationship between depression and its related 
dysfunctional schema, many studies (e.g. Deny and Kuiper, 1981; Hammen 
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and Zupan, 1984) employed descriptive adjectives to represent the 
dysfimctional schema in depressed subjects. Such single word adjectives 
are inadequate in representing the beliefs or the schema in individuals with 
emotional disturbances. None ofthe studies have included depression-
related cognitive distortions as competing predictors in regression analysis. 
The present study shows that depression-related dysfunctional schema is a 
less significant predictor ofdepression than depression-related cognitive 
distortions. 
Among the three subtypes of cognitive distortions, it was found that 
catastrophizing is a common information processing mechanism in both 
anxiety and depression. However, the events linked to this information 
process are different in anxiety and depression. In anxiety, the event is 
related to physical or psychological threat and danger in the future; whereas 
in depression, the event is related to ati actual loss or failure. 
Extemal attribution has been found to be specific to aggression. 
This finding is consistent with Dodge's social cognitive processing model in 
aggressive and depressed children (Crick & Dodge，1996; Dodge, 1993). 
According to Dodge's model, the dysfunctional schema associated with 
aggressive children would lead them to selectively attend to hostile cues, 
while the dysfunctional schema associated with depressed children would 
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lead them to selectively attend to cues on loss and failure. M other words, 
both groups of children display a common selection bias towards attending 
to different relevant stimuli in the environment, which was predisposed by 
their respectively dysfimctional schemas. However, aggressive children 
are more likely to see others' hostile intentions as unrelated to their own 
behaviours (external attribution), while depressed children are more likely 
to make internal, stable, and global attributions for the negative situations 
(personalizing) (QuiggIe et al., 1992). 
The present study shows that after partialling out the many correlated 
variables, depression-related external attribution was found to be inversely 
correlated with depression, though under the stringent criteria of the present 
study, this finding is considered to be insignificant. However, such 
association is still considered meaningful because it is in line with the 
results ofprevious studies (Crick & Dodge, 1996; Dodge，1993; QuiggIe et. 
al.，1992) and with the theoretical assumption of the present study. That is， 
the more depressed symptoms an individual displays, the less that he/she 
will utilize the information processing of external attribution. This further 
supports the conclusion that external attribution is specific to aggression. 
Aggression catastrophizing has been found to be a significant 
predictor of depression. A detailed inspection of the relevant items gives 
Cognitive Theory 
61 ‘ 
some clues. The vignettes in aggression catastrophizing basically include 
failure to enter a group, violation of one's own rights, or loss ofbelongings 
by someone who is stronger. The latter two situations can also be 
interpreted as a failure to protect one's own rights or belongings. Li other 
words, the events are also related to a loss or failure that has already 
happened. It is thus not surprised that these events will activate 
depression-related dysfunctional schema, and bias the information 
processing mechanism to produce depression. 
Personalizing has been consistently found to be associated with self-
reported and clinical depression (Joiner and Wagner, 1995). But when 
personalizing is competing with other types of cognitive distortions in 
regression analysis, it is not as strong a predictor as other variables, such as 
depression-related catastrophizing. Many previous studies have only 
examined the relationship between personalizing or internal attribution and 
depression. None ofthe studies have included catastrophizing as a 
competing predictor in regression analysis. The present study 
demonstrates that depression-related catastrophizing is a stronger predictor 
of depression than depression-related personalizing. 
The present study indicates that the patterns of findings in relation to 
predictors of disorders are generally similar across gender with a few 
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exceptions. Out ofthe 12 predictors of dysfunctional schemas and 
cognitive distortions in predicting anxiety, boys and girls only differ 
significantly in one predictor, that is，the anxiety-related catastrophizing. 
Similarly, out ofthe 12 predictors of dysfunctional schemas and cognitive 
distortions in predicting aggression, boys and girls only differ significantly 
in one predictor, that is, the aggression-related schema. Furthermore, there 
are two predictors (that is，aggression-related external attribution and 
aggression-related catastrophizing) which have been found to be significant 
in predicting the disorders in the total sample but become insignificant when 
boys and girls are considered separately. Since such differences are 
embedded in a large number of comparisons across gender, it is not sure 
whether they are chance phenomena or significant findings of importance. 
For the time being, it is not immediately evident in theoretical terms why 
such gender differences exist. There has not been a great deal of consistent 
literature on gender differences relating to our present area of investigation. 
Li the case ofthese two variables in which they become insignificant 
predictors once considered separately across gender，it is likely that 
diminished statistical power is at least part of the reasons for the change. 
Nonetheless, it is important to cross-validate our present findings with a 
replication study to rule out occasional chance findings. 
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In smnmary, two major findings have been obtained by the present 
study. First, the correlational study provides empirical support to the 
validity of cognitive model. That is，dysfunctional schema and cognitive 
distortions are significantly associated with emotional disturbances. 
Second, the hierarchical regression analyses show that each psychological 
disorder has its distinctive cognitive profile. That is, dysfimctional schema 
and cognitive distortions are disorder-specific. Anxiety is specified by 
anxiety-related dysfunctional schema and cognitive distortions; depression 
is specified by depression-related dysfunctional schema and cognitive 
distortions; and aggression is specified by aggression-related dysfimctional 
schema and cognitive distortions. In cognitive distortions, there is another 
kind of specificity in addition to disorder-specificity: the specificity of 
events linked to the cognitive distortions. Catastrophizing can be found in 
both anxiety and depression, but the event linked to the catastrophizing 
tendency in anxiety is related to future threat and danger, whereas the event 
linked to the catastrophizing tendency in depression is related to loss and 
failure that have occurred. 
Lnplications ofthe Study 
Differentiation of internalizing and externalizing disorders. 
Research on the cognitive specificity hypothesis has important implications 
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for the differentiation ofintemalizing and externalizing disorders. 
There is convincing evidence that childhood psychopathology can be 
divided along two dimensions comprised of externalizing and internalizing 
symptoms (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978). Externalizing problems are 
characterized by undercontrolled and aggressive behaviours, whereas 
internalizing problems include anxiety and depression. Though these two 
conditions are defined differently, they are correlated and co-occurring 
together. Achenbach (1991a，1991b，1991c) repeatedly found that 
internalizing and externalizing problems were moderately correlated at 
around .50 to .60 in both referred and non-referred popdations with 
different informants (that is, from parents, teachers, and the youths 
themselves). The rate of comorbidity between conduct disorder and 
depression / anxiety have also been found to range from 20% to as high as 
70% in studies (e.g. Angold & Costello, 1993; Bird et al., 1988). 
These correlations and comorbidity pose theoretical and nosologic 
dilemma. From a theoretical viewpoint, it presents a challenge ofhow to 
reconciliate such conceptually different conditions developing in the same 
individual and co-existing with each other (Kovacs et al., 1988), particularly 
between emotional and antisocial disturbances, which have been generally 
viewed as separate. The nosologic questions include whether or not these 
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comorbid disorders should be assigned to one single diagnostic category or 
two or more. 
There are several approaches to explain the co-occurrence of two or 
more disorders. The concept of "masked depression" was one ofthem. It 
was proposed that, due to developmental factors, the clinical presentation of 
depressed children is dominated or "masked" by features that are not 
traditionally associated with depression (Toolan, 1962; Glaser, 1968). 
According to this perspective, antisocial behaviours are considered to be 
masking symptoms of depression. Thus, their co-occurrence did not 
warrant a separate diagnosis, and the management is accordingly focused on 
depression. The second approach is to assign the comorbid conditions to a 
separate diagnostic entity (Caron and Rutter, 1991). That is, the comorbid 
condition is a new disorder, differing from their constituent disorders, and 
thus should receive different management from the constituent disorders. 
The present study reveals that intemalizng and externalizing disorders 
are separable with respect to their dysfunctional schemas and cognitive 
distortions. Li other words, each disorder has its specific underlying 
features; the comorbid condition is perhaps a hybrid of pure conditions 
(Schachar & Tannock，1995). M particular, present results found that 
aggression schema is associated with externalizing disorders but not 
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internalizing disorders. Besides, one subtype of cognitive distortions, 
namely external attribution, is specific to externalizing disorders, while 
another subtype of cognitive distortions, namely catastrophizing, is specific 
to internalizing disorders. Dysfimctional schemas and cognitive 
distortions can serve as markers in the differential diagnosis ofintemalizing 
problems from externalizing problems. Furthermore, the findings provide 
empirical support to the current practice of considering these two kinds of 
disorders as two separate diagnostic entities in psychiatric classification. 
Differentiation of amiety and depression. Phenomenologically, 
anxiety and depression are clearly distinct from each another. Anxiety is 
centered with the emotion of fear and involves feelings of worry and 
apprehension; in contrast, depression is dominated by the emotion of 
sadness and is associated with feelings ofhopelessness and gIoom. 
Nevertheless, despite their apparent distinctiveness，it has proven difficult to 
distinguish these constructs empirically (Clark & Watson, 1991; Maser & 
Cloninger, 1990). 
Anxiety and depression have been well-known for their moderate to 
high comorbidity and correlation. Their comorbidity rate ranged from as 
high as 75% to 30% in community as well as in clinical studies (Angold et 
al., 1993). Self-report ratings of anxiety and depression are often highly 
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correlated, with coefficient alphas ranging from .45 to .75 (Clark & Watson， 
1991). Similarly, clinicians' and teachers' ratings ofanxiety and 
depression are strongly correlated with each another (e.g. Moras, DiNardo 
& Barlow，1992). Such high comorbidity and correlation lead some 
investigators to suggest the need for a new diagnostic category of mixed 
anxiety-depression (e.g. Zinbarg et al., 1994) 
There are attempts to address the issue of comorbidity between 
anxiety and depression. For example, Clark and Watson (1991),s tripartite 
model states that both anxiety and depression share a common factor of 
general distress, but they are differentiable by the absence of positive 
emotional experiences in depression. However, the present study gives 
clues to another way of distinguishing anxiety and depression; they are 
separable with respect to the dysfunctional shcemas and cognitive 
distortions. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The present study explores the validity and the specificity hypothesis 
ofBeck's cognitive model in a community sample of adolescents. Two 
major findings have been revealed First, the cognitive model is applicable 
to anxiety, depression, and aggression. Second, each of these disorders has 
its distinctive cognitive profile in terms ofhaving specific content of 
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dysfunctional schema and specific subtype of cognitive distortions. Within 
cognitive distortions, there is another kind of specificity: the specificity of 
events linked to the cognitive distortions. 
These findings have further implications. Dysfunctional schemas 
and cognitive distortions can be considered as the extemal correlates (Leung 
et. al., 1996) that validate the independence of anxiety from depression，and 
the independence of internalizing problems from externalizing problems. 
Besides，it is necessary to consider assessment of dysfimctional schemas 
and cognitive distortions as part of a comprehensive evaluation of an 
adolescent with one or more psychiatric disorders, because such assessment 
not only sheds light on the possibility of differential diagnosis, it also serves 
as a better guide to treatment selection than the traditional categorical 
diagnoses. 
Comments and Future Direction 
The present study can be regarded as a pilot study for the two newly 
developed instruments, the DSQ and the CDQ. Some refinement of the 
measurements may be necessary so as to make them more sensitive in 
exploring the dysfimctional schemas and cognitive distortions in adolescents. 
Second, the present sample is a community sample. It is thus uncertain 
how our current findings can be generalizable to clinical population. 
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Attempts to look at this issue in the present sample will not be successftd. 
Since the questionnaires used are not diagnostic measures, we camiot 
legitimately identify clinical groups from our community sample for further 
examination. It is thus recommended to conduct a replication study with 
clinical populations to cross-validate the generalizability ofour current 
findings. Finally, as the relationship between dysfunctional schemas and 
cognitive distortions has not been explored in the present study, this aspect 
may be considered in future research. Perhaps, the combination of 
dysfunctional schemas and cognitive distortions may serve as a good 
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English and Chinese Versions of the 
Dysfunctional Schema Questionnaire 
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Dysfunctional Schema Questionnaire (DSQ) 
1. Li order to be happy, I have to be successful in whatever I 
undertake. (Beck, 1979, p.246) 
2. To be happy, I must be accepted by all people at all times. 
(Beck, 1979, p. 246) 
3. Jf I make a mistake, it means that I am inept. (Beck, 1979，p.246) 
4. My value as a person depends on what others think ofme. 
(Beck, 1979, p.246) 
5. K somebody disagrees with me，it means he doesn't like me. 
(Beck, 1979, p.246) 
6. I need other people to help me get by. (Young, 1990, p. 69) 
7. I do not feel I can cope well by myself. (Young, 1990, p.69) 
8. I believe that other people can take care of me better than I can 
take care ofmyself. (Young, 1990, p.69) 
9. I'm inept in most areas of life. (Young, 1990，p. 69) 
10. I don't feel confident about my ability to solve everyday 
problems that come up. (Young, 1990, p.69) 
11. Any strange situation should be regarded as dangerous. (Beck 
etal., 1985, p.63) 
12. A situation or a person is unsafe until proven to be safe. (Beck et 
al., 1985, p.63) 
13. It's always best to assume the worst. (Beck et al., 1985, p.63) 
Cognitive Theory 
81 ‘ 
14. My security and safety depend on anticipating and preparing 
myself at all times for any possible danger. (Beck et al., 1985, 
p.63) 
15. m make a mistake, I will fail. (Clark, 1989，p. 56) 
16. Jf I fail the exam, I will never be able to face my fiiends or 
family. (Beck et al., 1985, p.63) 
17. I can't seem to escape the feeling that something bad is about to 
happen. (Young, 1990, p.70) 
18. I feel that a disaster (natural, criminal, financial, or medical) 
could strike at any moment. (Young, 1990, p.70) 
19. I worry about being attacked. (Young, 1990, p.70) 
20. I am a fearM person. (Young, 1990, p.70) 
21. Force or cunning is the best way to get things done. (Beck & 
Freeman, 1990, p. 361) 
22. We live in ajungIe and the strong person is the one who survives. 
(Beck & Freeman, 1990, p. 361) 
23. People will get at me of I don't get them first. (Beck & Freeman, 
1990, p. 361) 
24. It is not important to keep promises or honour debts. (Beck & 
Freeman, 1990, p. 361) 
25. Lying and cheating are OK as long as you don't get caught. 
(Beck & Freeman, 1990, p. 361) 
26. I have been unfairly treated and am entitled to get my fair share 
by whatever means I can. (Beck & Freeman, 1990, p. 361) 
27. Jfl want something, I should do whatever is necessary to get it. 
(Beck & Freeman, 1990, p. 361) 
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28. Most people only think about themselves. (Young, 1990, p.66) 
29. I am quite suspicious of other people's motives. (Yomig, 1990, 
p.66) 
30. Other people are rarely honest; they are usually not what they 









完 少 大 完 
全 部 部 全 
不 份 份 準 
準 準 準 確 
確 確 確 
1. 我要在所有的事情上成功，才可以得到快樂。 1 2 3 4 
2. 我要在任何時候都得到所有人的接納，才會感到快樂。 1 2 3 4 
3. 如果我犯了一個錯娱，那表示我是個不中用的人。 1 2 3 4 
4. 我做人的價値取決於别人對我的評價。 1 2 3 4 
5. 如果有人不同意我的看法，那表示他/她不喜歡我。 1 2 3 4 
6. 我一定要成功，做人才算有價值。 1 2 3 4 
7. 我不認爲單靠自己，就可以應付我的問題。 1 2 3 4 
8. 我相信其他人會比我更懂得照顧我自己。 1 2 3 4 
9. 在大多數生活上的事情，我都是失敗的。 1 2 3 4 
10.我沒有信心自己能夠解決日常生活的困擾。 1 2 3 4 
11.任何陌生的環境都應被視爲危險。 1 2 3 4 
12.所有人或處境都是危險的，直至被钲實安全爲止。 1 2 3 4 
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完 少 大 完 
全 部 部 全 
不 份 份 準 
準 準 準 確 fife f^e jHS ^^ fc f^fi. 7^ff. 
13.凡事最好作最壞的打算。 1 2 3 4 
14.我不能倚賴他人去保障我的安全。我一定要自己保護自 
己 ° 1 2 3 4 
15.如果我犯一個錯娱，我就會失敗。 1 2 3 4 
16.如果我考試不合格，我將永遠不能面對我的朋友及家人。 1 2 3 4 
17.我不能擺脱一種壞的預感。 1 2 3 4 
18.我惑到一場大災禍(天災、罪案、財政、或疾病)將會隨時 
在我身上發生。 1 2 3 4 
19.我擔心受人襲擎。 1 2 3 4 
20.我是一個膽小的人。 1 2 3 4 
21.武力及跪計是達到目標的最好方法。 1 2 3 4 
22.我們生活在一個弱肉強食的地方，抵有強者才能生存。 1 2 3 4 
23.如果我不先發制人，别人便會欺負我。 1 2 3 4 
24.遵守語言或欠債還錢，都是不重要的。 1 2 3 4 
25.抵要不被人發現，説謊或欺編都是沒有問題的。 1 2 3 4 
26.我曾受到不公平的對待，所以我有權用任何方法去取回我 
所應得的。 1 1 3 4 
27.我應該不惜一切去爭取我所想要的東西。 1 1 3 4 
28.大多數人抵會爲自己的利益著想。 1 2 3 4 
29.我很懷疑别人眞正的動機。 1 2 3 4 




English and Chinese Versions of the 
Cognitive Distortion Questionnaire 
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Cognitive Distortions Questionnaire (CDQ) 
1. While you are having your lunch in the school canteen, one of 
the kids bumped into you and dropped your whole tray on the 
floor. You think: 
"Because I have not placed my tray properly, people then come 
to bully me". 
2. You play soccer with some kids at recess. You kicked the ball 
into teachers' room. The kids did not know how to do. You 
think: 
"It's not my fault. The one who pass the ball too high to me 
should be blamed". 
3. Your classmates would play volley ball with the next class. 
You want to play a part. But your classmates said there was no 
room for you. You think: 
"They do not like to play with me. People are all selfish, they 
would only think about themselves". 
4. After moming assembly, a big guy tells you to take his school 
bag to the classroom because he has some engagement. You 
think: 
"He bullies me because he's bigger than me. This is really a 
dog-eat-dog society." 
5. Today when you are leaving school, you see three guys walking 
towards you. They keep looking at you from head to toe. 
You think, 
"They are hostile to me. Must be because I shouM not look at 
them first." 
6. You and your fiiend were caught by the police while climbing 
over the bar in crossing the road. You think: 
"The police catch me all because my fiiend is too slow in 
escape". 
7. You are standing in line waiting for the bus after school. A guy 
come and cut in front of you. You think: 
“Hejumps the queue because I do not line up properly". 
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8. You bring a basket ball to school. You leave it at the comer of 
the playground and then go to the classroom. You return to the 
playground during recess and find some seniors are playing with 
your ball. You think: 
"They took my ball without my consent because they are more 
senior than me. This is really an unfair society." 
9. You have just bought a new cartoon book and you keep reading 
it while walking on the street. You accidentally knock into an 
old lady. You think: 
"This is not my fault. She's too old to walk smartly in street." 
10. You want to join some kids who are reading a story book during 
recess. You approach them but they concentrate on the book 
and take no notice ofyou. You think : 
"They reject me on purpose. I am the one who are always 
unfairly treated" 
11. You are hiking with several kids. Li the middle of the joumey, 
one of the kids ask you to take his bag of food for him. You 
think: 
"He take advantage ofme and ask me to take his bag all because 
I have walked too slowly." 
12. You have been assigned by the teacher to clean up the classroom 
after school, but you have a prior engagement. You ask one kid 
to do the cleansing for you. This is being discovered by the 
teacher, and that guy has to be punished You think: 
"This is not my fauk. He's not smart enough." 
13. Some kids take tum to play an electronic game in recess. You 
find it very interesting and you tell them that you also want to 
join in. One guy tells you to follow the queue. You think: 
"They want to exclude me. People like to bully the weak one." 
14. You go to a bike ride on Sunday with your fnends. When you 
are having a fierce contest with your fiiends, the bike of a boy 
near you is overturned. You think: 
"He deserves it. He shouM not block my way." 
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15. You go to a movie this weekend. When your arrive at the 
cinema, there is a long queue for the tickets. You cut in the 
line. You think: 
‘Tm notjumping the queue on purpose. It's because that guy is 
not standing in line properly.“ 
16. You are studying in the school library. A boy pass by and drop 
your book on the ground. You think: 
"People come to bully me because I talk too loud in the library." 
17. You want to play table tennis with your peers in recess. Some 
seniors reach the table first. They tell you they arrive first, so 
they should use the table. You think: 
"They bully juniors. This is the jungle of the forest. ” 
18. You go to a bookstore to buy a new cartoon book. There is 
only one left on the shelf. When you try to reach it, a guy push 
you from the back and take the book away. You think: 
"He snatches the book because I am not smart enough." 
19. Your class is having 4-person relay race in gym class. Your 
team loses. You think, 
" f f I hadjust been faster we would not have lost" 
20. You have lose a badminton contest. You think, 
"I am not good at athlete. I won't take part in athletic contest 
any more." 
21. Your team loses in a contest. The other team won easily. 
You think: 
"Jfl were smarter, we would not lost." 
22. Your class is having 4-person relay races in gym class. Your 
team loses. You think: 
"Jfmy team-mates hadjust been faster, we would not lost." 
23. You participate in a quiz contest in school. Your team loses, 
the other team won easily. You think: 
"Ifthe other team mates were smarter, we would not have lost." 
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24. You and three other students completed a group science project. 
Your teacher did not think it was good and gave a poor grade. 
You think: 
"ff I hadn't done such a lousy job, we would have got a good 
grade." 
25. There is a reciting contest in school. You want to be the 
representative of your class, but you have not been selected 
You think: 
"I am not good at studying. My parents would be very 
disappointed" 
26. You are with some of your fnends. Your best fiiend talks to 
other kids instead of you. You think: 
“My friend did not seem to want to be with me today. I am 
afraid that we won't be friends any more." 
27. You are taking high jump class. The instructor tells the class 
that they are not ready for the high levels. You thinks: 
'Tf I coidd only leam faster, I would not be holding everyone 
up.，， 
28. You take part in a orienteering contest with your fiiends. Your 
team loses. Your think, 
‘Tfmy friends could know the compass well, we woidd not lost" 
29. You return home by bus with your fiiends after school. You've 
just miss one bus on arriving at the bus stop. You think: 
"lf my fiiends coidd walk faster, I would not have missed the 
bus." 
30. You call one of the kids in your class to talk about your maths 
homework. He/she says, “I can't talk to you now, my father 
needs to use the phone." You think: 
"He/she didn't want to talk to me.” 
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31. Two of the kids in your class chat with each other in recess. 
When you approach them, they head for the playground. You 
think: 
"They do not want to befriend with me." 
32. You and other students have a reading project and plan to look 
up information in the library. But when you arrive at the 
library, it has been closed You think: 
" f f I could walk faster, we wouM not miss the opening hour." 
33. You and other students completed a science model. The 
teacher thinks the design lacks creativity, and gave your group a 
poor grade. You think: 
"K I had not done such a lousy job, we would have got a good 
grade." 
34. You have a bad grade in the maths examination this term. You 
think: “I am no good at anything." 
35. You have breakfast with some kids, and plan to buy a set of 
newly issued stamps afterwards. When you arrive at the post 
office, the stamps have been sold out. You think: 
‘Ef the other kids have not been so slow, I would not miss the 
chance." 
36. The kids in your class are requested to group into three to 
practise an English drama and perform it in class. Today，after 
your group's performance, the teacher thought your group's 
pronunciation is incorrect and gave a poor grade. You think: 
"We got such a poor grade all because the kids in the group are 
too lazy to practise." 
37. You invite one of your fiiends to have dinner at home. The 
other fiiend knows about it. You think: 
"He/she would be angry about it. This is my fault." 
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38. Your badminton team is having practice. The coach tells you 
he would like to talk to you after practice. You think: 
"He is not happy with how I am doing and he does not want me 
in the team anymore." 
39. You forgot to bring your English homework to school. Your 
teacher tells the class to hand them in. You think, 
"The teacher is going to think I have not done my homework and 
I won't pass the English exam." 
40. Your gymnastic team is having practice. The coach tells you he 
/she would like to talk to you after practice. You think, 
"He/she is going to scold me fiercely. My performance is 
already up to standard. He/she only makes fuss with i t " 
41. You did an extra credit assignment. Your teacher tells you that 
he would like to talk to you about it. You think: 
"He thinks I did a lousy job on my assignment and is going to 
give me a bad grade." 
42. You gave a new cassette disc to one of your fiiends. Your best 
fiiend knows about it. You think: 
"I am going to make my best fnend angry." 
43. Your class have to nm ten laps in gym class. When you still 
have five laps to go, your heart beat fast and you breathe heavily. 
You think: 
“I am going to have a heart attack and am going to die." 
44. When you are having the maths class, the teacher tells you that 
he wants to talk to you after class. You think: 
"He is going to punish me. My performance is already up to 
standard. He only expects too h i ^ from me." 
45. You invite one of your friends to come to your birthday party. 
Your another fiiend know about it. You think, “I am going to 
make him/her angry. He/she is a mean person." 
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46. You cannot go for hiking because you have sprained your ankle. 
Now your fiiends decided to change to watching movie. You 
think: 
"I am going to make my friends unhappy. This is my fault." 
47. You join an English spelling contest. You have spelled ten 
words wrong. You think: 
“I am going to lose the contest, and therefore others would look 
down upon me." 
48. Your cousin calls you to ask whether you would like to go on a 
long bike ride. You think: 
“I probably won't be able to keep up and people will make fun of 
me.” 
49. You have just started a part-time job and is unable to go on a 
bike ride with your fnends. Now your fiiends decided to 
change to go to a concert. You think: 
"They would be very angry with me. It's all my fault" 
50. You are having the history class and have just received the test 
result. The teacher tells you that he would like to talk to you 
after class. You think: 
"He/she must think that I have done a bad job and would scold 
me for that. He/she's such a fault-finding person.“ 
51. You have organised a band with your fiiends. You are the 
guitar player. Now you have cau^ t a cold and your band is 
having a contest tomorrow. You think: 
“I am going to fail my band It's all my fault." 
52. You have made a birthday present for one of your fiiends. 
Another friend knows about it. You think: 
"He/she will be angry with me. He/she is ajealous person." 
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53. You have forgotten to do one item of the maths assignment. 
Now the teacher requests the class to hand in the homework. 
You think: 
"The teacher must think that I omitted that item deliberately. 
He/she used to be a mean person." 
54. You promised to buy a new cartoon book for your fiiends in the 
book exhibition. When you arrive at the exhibition venue, you 
found a long queue. You think: 
"I am going to disappoint my fhends. It is my fault of having 













和 和 大 抵 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 










這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 
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和 和 大 祇 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 





















這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 
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和 和 大 抵 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 




這個想法： 1 1 3 4 5 





這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 










這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 
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和 和 大 抵 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 
樣 似 似 



















這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 
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和 和 大 祇 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 





















快。」這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 
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和 和 大 抵 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 




這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 
20. 令天你在學校输了 一場羽毛球比賽。你想： 
「我不是一個運動的人材。我以後也不會參加任何 
運動比赛。」 
這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 
21. 你的隊伍在一場比赛中输了。另一隊輕易地取勝。 
你想：「如果我聰明些，我隊便不會輪。」 








這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 
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和 和 大 抵 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 
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和 和 大 抵 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 



















這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 
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和 和 大 祇 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 











這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 
34. 這學期你的數學測驗考得差。你想： 
「我沒有一件事是傲得好的。j 






這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 
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和 和 大 抵 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 
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和 和 大 抵 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 





這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 





1 2 3 4 5 
42. 你送了 一張最新出版的错射唱片給你的一位同學，給 
你的好同學知道。你想： 
「弊傢伙！我將會激怒我的好同學了！」 




這個想法： 1 2 3 4 5 
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和 和 大 抵 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 
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和 和 大 抵 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 
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和 和 大 抵 我 
我 我 概 有 完 
的 的 和 少 全 
想 想 我 部 不 
法 法 的 份 會 
差 有 想 和 這 
不 很 法 我 樣 
多 大 相 的 想 
一 程 似 想 
模 度 法 
一 相 相 
樣 似 似 
52. 你親手造了 一份生日禮物送給你的一位朋友，給另一 
位朋友知道。你想： 
「這朋友將會生我的氣。他/她一向善妒。j 














English and Chinese Versions of the 
CosteUo-Comrey Anxiety Scale 
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Coste11o-Comrey Anxiety Scale 
1.1 get rattled easily. 
2. When faced with excitement or unexpected situations, I become 
nervous andjumpy. 
3.1 am cahn and not easity upset. 
4. When things go wrong I get nervous and upset instead ofcaMy 
thinking out a solution. 
5. It makes me nervous when I have to wait. 
6.1 am a tense，'^ igh-strung" person. 
7.1 am more sensitive than most other people. 
8. My hand shakes when I try to do something. 









很 有 時 無 
少 時 
或 時 常 無 
全 刻 
無 
1.我很容易變得神經緊張 1 2 3 4 
2.面對剌激或突發的事情，我變得情緒激動，心神 
不定 1 2 3 4 
3.我很鎭定，不輕易感到煩乱不安 1 2 3 4 
4.面對困難時，我感到煩燥不安，不能平心靜氣地 
去想出解決方法 1 2 3 4 
5.等待使我緊張 1 2 3 4 
6.我覺得我是個神經過敏的人 1 2 3 4 
7.我比其他人敏惑，容易吃驚 1 2 3 4 
8.傲很多事時我都會手震 1 2 3 4 




English and Chinese Versions of the 
Depression SetfRating Scale 
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Depression SetfRating Scale 
I.1 look forward to things as much as I used to 
2.1 sleep very weU 
3.1 feel Hke crying 
4.1 feel Uke nmning away 
5.1 get tummy aches 
6.1 have lots ofenergy 
7.1 enjoy my food 
8.1 think Ufe isn't worth Hving 
9.1 can stick up for mysetf 
10.1 enjoy the things I do as much as I used to 
I I .1 Hke taUdng with my famity 
12.1 have horrible dreams 
13.1 feel very lonely 
14.1 am easity cheered up 
15.1 feel so sad I can hardly stand it 
16.1 am good at things I do 
17.1 feel very bored 
18.1 Hke to go out to play 
19.1 have suicidal ideation 








很 間 從 
多 中 來 
時 有 沒 
有 有 
1. 我和以往一樣，對事物充滿希望 1 2 3 
2. 我睡得很好 1 2 3 
3. 我想哭 1 2 3 
4. 我想逃走 1 2 3 
5. 我有胃痛 1 2 3 
6. 我的精力十足 1 2 3 
7. 吃東西對我來説是一種享受 1 1 3 
8. 我認爲生存沒有價値 1 2 3 
9. 我能維護自己的權利 1 2 3 
10.我一向都喜愛我所做的事 1 2 3 
11.我喜歡和家人談話 1 2 3 
12.我有發惡夢 1 2 3 
13.我覺得很孤單 1 2 3 
14.我很容易高興起來 1 2 3 
15.我的憂愁已達到難以忍受的地步 1 2 3 
16.我能好好地完成我要做的事 1 2 3 
17.我感到十分苦問 1 2 3 
18.我喜歡尋求樂趣 1 2 3 
19.我有自殺的念頭 1 2 3 
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Aggression subscale ofYouth SdfReport Form 
I.1 argue a lot 
2.1 brag 
3.1 am mean to others 
4.1 try to get a lot ofattention 
5.1 destroy my own things 
6.1 destroy things belonging to others 
7.1 disobey at school 
8.1 amjealous ofothers 
9.1 get in many fights 
10.1 physciaUy attack others 
I I .1 scream a lot 
12.1 show offor clowtt 
13.1 am stubborn 
14. My mood or fedings change suddenly 
15.1 tSi]k too much 
16.1 tease others a lot 
17.1 have a hot tender 
18.1 thretaen to hurt people 






不準確，請團1 ；接近或間中準確，請團2 ；非常或經常準確，請圓3。 
不 接 非 
準 近 常 





1.我經常爭辯 1 2 3 
2.我愛自誇 1 2 3 
3.我對别人哿刻 1 2 3 
4.我要求别人經常注意自己 1 2 3 
5.我破壞自己的東西 1 2 3 
6.我破壞别人的東西 1 2 3 
7.我在學校不聽話 1 2 3 
8.我容易妒忌别人 1 2 3 
9.我經常與人打架 1 2 3 
10.我攻擊他人身體 1 2 3 
11.我經常尖叫 1 2 3 
12.我怯耀自己或扮小丑 1 2 3 
13.我很固執 1 2 3 
14.我的情緒或感受會突然變化 1 2 3 
15.我説話過多 1 2 3 
16.我常戲弄他人 1 2 3 
17.我的脾氣暴躁 1 2 3 
18.我恐嚇要傷害他人 1 2 3 
19.我比其他年青人更吵鬧 1 2 3 
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